The impact of the Representation of the People Act of 1918 on the politics of the West Midlands by Cawood, Ian
This is the peer reviewed version of the following article: Cawood, Ian (2018) The impact of the 
Representation of the People Act of 1918 on the politics of the West Midlands. Parliamentary History, 
37 (1). pp. 81-100, which has been published in final form at https://doi.org/10.1111/1750-0206.12339 . 
This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and 
Conditions for Self-Archiving. 
The impact of the Representation of the People Act of 1918 on the politics of the 
West Midlands. 
Ian Cawood 
Newman University, Birmingham 
Abstract:  
Despite the impact of the Representation of the People Act (1918) on the political 
culture of the west midland region in the inter-war years, the elements of continuity in 
the politics of the region are striking. The Labour Party failed to dislodge the 
Unionists’ political control in the region (with the exception of the Black Country) for 
most of the 1920s and 1930s, despite the presence of a significant industrial working 
class population in the bulk of the region’s constituencies. The article argues that the 
lack of significant redistribution of seats in the region, despite wartime growth in all 
urban areas, enabled the well-organised and well-funded Unionist organisations 
controlled by Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain to adapt the cross-class, 
non-denominational message to appeal to the newly enlarged electorate. Although 
the Labour Party appeared on the brink of a breakthrough in the west midlands, 
owing to this ‘franchise factor’, the Unionists adapted better to the new age of mass 
communications and political sloganeering which replaced the Edwardian politics of 
confrontation and public meetings. The Representation of the People Act of 1918 
may have changed the political culture of elections in Britain, but, in the west 
midlands at least, it did not alter the Unionists’ ability to manage the outcomes of the 
elections. 
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The Representation of the People Act (RPA) had a greater impact on British politics 
than any other single piece of legislation since the Great Reform Act of 1832. The 
introduction of universal male suffrage and the extension of the franchise to most 
women aged 30 years and over significantly increased the parliamentary electorate, 
while a redistribution of constituencies increased the importance of large cities and 
industrial counties. Only one in four of the electorate in 1918 would have been on the 
electoral roll in 1910. In Birmingham, for example, the Act increased the electorate 
from. 95,000 to 427,084 voters (165,000 of whom were women over 30). Across the 
whole of the west midland region the number of registered voters increased between 
1910 and 1918 from 573, 231 to 1,581,439. Despite this transformation, Pat Thane 
has recently noted that the political system created by the RPA of 1918 was 
remarkably stable, when compared to the rest of Europe.1 The best symptom of that 
stability in the west midlands was the preservation of largely pre-war voting patterns 
across the region, despite the mass enfranchisement and the effects of the First 
World War. William Miller asserted in 1977 that ‘the West Midlands were always pro-
Conservative and anti-Labour.’ 2 Whilst this judgement is rather crude as it fails to 
understand the uniquely ‘Unionist’ nature of politics in the region and takes no 
account of the breakthrough of Labour in the Black Country and the Staffordshire 
Potteries after 1918, it is true that the region was at the heart of the Unionists’ 
national dominance between 1918 and 1939. This was achieved despite an apparent 
transformation in the political culture of Britain after the First World War, which 
demonstrates the continued resilience, adaptability and successful leadership of the 
Unionist Party in the region. 
Before 1918 west midland politics had been dominated by Joseph 
Chamberlain’s radical Liberal Unionists, although the party’s control had retreated 
towards the city of Birmingham as his older son, Austen, failed to prevent 
Conservatives from being allocated the outlying constituencies on the retirement of 
Liberal Unionist MPs and the Liberal Party was resurgent in the region after 1900 
(although this was not as extensive as elsewhere).3 Whilst the trades councils had 
proved less antagonistic during the First World War than in most areas, there was 
clear evidence of growing militancy in towns such as Wolverhampton and 
Wednesbury.4 Any potential growth of the Labour Party to challenge the middle class 
political hegemony in the region had largely been stifled by the limited franchise in 
the Edwardian period. However, after 1918, Labour was increasingly able to offer 
itself as an alternative to the traditional message of cross-class Unionism and the 
carefully presented rural appeal of Baldwin.5  Labour made a sufficiently large 
breakthrough in the region in December 1918, winning six seats in the Black Country 
and the Potteries, that they were able to persuade one of the few National 
Democratic and Labour MPs, Eldred Hallas, who had won Birmingham Duddeston, 
to cross the floor of the Commons and join them in 1919. Although Hallas retired at 
the 1922 election, Birmingham had seen its first Labour MP, albeit one who the 
Unionist newspaper Straight Forward derided as having ‘deserted those who had 
made easy his pathway into Parliamentary life.’6 Labour also made some significant 
progress in local politics, with the Birmingham Labour Party stealing a march on the 
complacent local Unionist associations and launching an effective municipal 
campaign nearly six months before the local elections were held, focusing on 
‘housing, our Municipal Services…Gas and Tram charges and the elimination of a 
narrow, selfish policy.’7 They consequently experienced a significant increase in their 
vote in the ward elections and in November won 12 of the 20 municipal seats 
contested in Birmingham and a third of the seats in Coventry.8  
In the historiography of post-1918 British politics, the Labour Party has been 
traditionally seen as the chief beneficiary of the expansion of the electorate, and the 
sudden decline of the Liberal Party in the west midlands seems to confirm the 
arguments of those who believe in the ‘franchise factor.’9 Those who supported 
‘progressive’ policies in the region now tended to vote for the Labour candidate who 
offered the stronger challenge to the Unionist candidate. As Michael Dawson has 
explained, the restriction of electoral expenses meant that ‘Labour could now afford 
to fight more seats than before the war, which created an insurmountable challenge 
for a divided and demoralised Liberal party.’10 By contrast, Duncan Tanner has 
pointed out that ‘there were no inherent sociological reasons why the newly 
enfranchised men should have voted solidly for Labour’.11 It should be noted that 
after their initial breakthrough, Labour failed to make much more significant progress 
in the region until the later 1920s, which suggests that the effects of the RPA were 
more complex than have hitherto been recognized. 
The implications of the RPA for party organisation were swiftly realized, with 
the Unionist Gleanings and Memoranda reporting on the likely outcomes of the 
Speaker’s Conference as early as February 1917.12 This presented a serious 
challenge for all of the parties which had been largely dormant in the latter years of 
the conflict. The Conservative Party Archive at the Bodleian library notes that ‘no 
pamphlets were issued by the Conservative [sic] Party during the war years 1915, 
1916 and 1917’ (although Gleanings and Memoranda continued to be printed 
monthly until February 1917).13 
In the same way that party organisation had had to respond to the advent of a 
mass electorate in 1884, with the increased professionalization of Liberal, 
Conservative and, subsequently, Liberal Unionist associations, so there was a need 
for greater efforts in management of both party and electoral issues once the age of 
near-full democracy arrived in 1918. Neville Chamberlain took the opportunity to 
press the much over-due fusion of Liberal Unionist and Conservative organisations 
in Birmingham in early 1918 and, similarly, he ensured that the regional body, the 
Midland Union, was also revitalised.14 The central National Unionist Association 
attempted to challenge the new Birmingham Unionist Association when it involved 
the patriotic National Democratic and Labour Party in the 1918 electoral campaign.15 
When its leading figures, such as Eldred Hallas and Victor Fisher, were forced upon 
west midland constituencies, Chamberlain ‘objected to this procedure on the part of 
the Central Office’, as his father had done before him in the 1890s, and Fisher’s 
disastrous campaign in Stourbridge allowed Chamberlain to demonstrate his 
superior local political knowledge.16 In April 1919, the Unionist Central Office handed 
effective control of the choice of west midland candidates to Chamberlain. He now 
held the wires of party patronage firmly in his hands and he insisted upon local 
constituencies accepting his chosen candidates.17 When ‘dissentient Unionists’ in 
Kings Norton objected to his choice of Sir Herbert Austin as their candidate on 
unspecified ‘questions of policy’ in October 1918, they were swiftly slapped down.18 
The revitalised Midland Union also spread its influence in the immediate post-war 
years, resisting an attempt by Derbyshire to break away and taking Gloucestershire 
under its control.19 
If the years before the First World War had required an increasingly professionalised 
party organisation20, the effects of the RPA tested the resources of all the parties. 
The Unionist Party’s apparatus may have rested during the war, manned by a 
skeleton staff, but it emerged far more united and capable of fighting the series of 
four general elections that ensued between 1918 and 1924, appointing W.A. J. 
Gibbs as the organising agent for the midlands in August 1920, putting up 
candidates in all of the seats that were uncontested by ‘couponed’ non-Unionists in 
1918 and then contesting every seat with a Unionist candidate in 1922, 1923 and 
1924.21 The style of organisation had to evolve, however, as the scale of 
campaigning was now the crucial work of the local association, rather than making 
challenges to the electoral register.22 The Birmingham Unionist Association quickly 
identified the need for  
polling-district committees and their officers , the arranging of frequent 
meetings of such committees, the splitting up of the polling districts into 
streets or parts of streets so that each particular member of a polling-district 
committee should be responsible for the electors in a particular street or part 
of such a street.23 
The Association consequently established a Propaganda Society and organised a 
well-attended free ‘Demonstration and Garden Fete’ at the Birmingham Botanical 
Gardens on 18 September 1920, where the political speeches were interspersed 
with an ‘amusement side’ which featured performances by ‘the Birmingham Small 
Arms band, concert parties, conjuror, ventriloquist, concertina performers and other 
artistes.’24 As well as the Women’s organisations, a Junior Unionist association was 
launched in Ladywood in July 1921.25 The result of all this activity was that in the 
municipal elections of November 1920, the feared socialist advance failed to 
materialise with the Unionists winning 22 out of 23 contested wards.26 The divided 
Liberal Party, starved of funds, was swiftly pushed to the margins in the region in the 
1918 general election, with only two Asquithian Liberals returned27, together with one 
independent Liberal28 and just one ‘couponed’ Liberal.29 Any coalition Liberals 
standing in municipal election were entirely dependent on Unionist organisational 
support. The Labour Party swiftly overtook the Liberals as the chief opposition to the 
Unionists, standing in 27 west midland constituencies in 1918 and it was the sole 
opposition to the Unionists in ten of these seats. Labour organisation, largely funded 
by the growth of trade union membership during the war, took time to develop, with 
eight Unionists and one Coalition Liberal candidate in the region who faced no 
contest in the general election of 1918.This allowed the Unionists to build a strong 
parliamentary tradition in the county seats and larger boroughs which Labour was 
unable to overturn fully, even in 1929.30  
The War Emergency Workers National Committees, which David Powell 
identifies as providing vital support for Labour in the post-war years elsewhere, were 
noticeably absent in the west midlands.31 The Birmingham branch of the 
Independent Labour Party was, unlike elsewhere, also distinctly ineffective at first, 
spending most of autumn 1918 focussing on attending national conferences, passing 
resolutions protesting against issues such as the imprisonment of John Maclean, 
and discussing the release of Karl Liebknecht by the new SPD government in 
Germany, rather than preparing for the imminent general election. Councillor Mundy 
warned the branch in February 1919 ‘that elections couldn’t be won from 
platforms.’32 The Birmingham Central Labour Party and Trades Council had largely 
been captured by pacifists and anti-conscription campaigners in 1915 and their 1918 
election campaign was as hapless as that of the local ILP. This was in marked 
contrast to the effective organisation of the local party in the Black Country, and even 
in such unpromising rural constituencies as Oswestry and Shrewsbury.33  However, 
after its electoral rout in 1918, the Birmingham Labour Party quickly learned its 
lesson and swiftly re-organised, appointing a new executive committee and divisional 
organisers, a professional clerk and offices equipped with a telephone.34 Funds were 
raised for elections, well in advance, with George Cadbury annually contributing 
£50.35 They also adopted a new slogan to distance themselves from their previous 
mistakes: ‘Not Pious Resolutions, but WORK & VOTE FOR LABOUR 
CADIDATES.’36 It was the development of the constituency Labour parties which 
harnessed the enthusiasm of individual party members and which gradually enabled 
the Labour Party to organise sufficiently so that it was able to contest 11 seats 
successfully in the 1923 election (including the capture of Coventry, the Wrekin and 
Lichfield) and even to gain 46% of the vote in Neville Chamberlain’s own seat at 
Ladywood.37 The Labour Party also began organising a plethora of affiliated social 
organisations such as choirs, cycling clubs and drama groups. The Birmingham 
Labour Town Crier was also a far less overtly party political publication than the 
Birmingham Unionist Straight Forward, continuing the vibrant print culture of pre-war 
Birmingham by including book and theatre reviews, ‘our children’s corner’, a 
gardening column, a serial story and items on socialist history.  By contrast, Straight 
Forward failed to print anything more than encomiums of party leaders, details of 
Unionist events and endless exhortations for ‘armchair Unionists’ to rouse 
themselves. Even with the backing of local Unionist businesses such as Mitchell and 
Butlers, Bird’s of Wolverhampton and Birmingham Small Arms, Straight Forward was 
only ever a monthly publication, with often more illustrations than editorial material, 
while Town Crier survived as a weekly until after the Second World War, despite only 
carrying adverts from Westwood’s (kitchenware) and the S.M. Company (‘shirts  and 
overalls…made by trade union labour’) in its early editions and only achieving an 
estimated circulation of 1,500 copies.38 This was probably due to the response to 
regular appeals for financial support such as that issued to local trade unionists in 
November 1920.39  
The Labour Party did attempt to appeal beyond its traditional support-base 
among unionised industrial workers, as soon as the war was over. In the west 
midlands, Labour contested county seats such as Oswestry and Evesham for the 
first time in December 1918 even though, as Clare Griffiths notes, ‘most rural areas 
had no Labour organisation before 1918.’40 Yet in 1918 Labour won 40% of the votes 
in Oswestry, where Tom Morris was the sole opponent to the Coalition MP, William 
Bridgeman. This was partly due to what Nicholas Mansfield has described as ‘the 
ambivalence to the war on the part of many of the rural poor.’’41 Although the local 
party in Oswestry admitted after the election that it had been poorly organised and it 
was hampered by a lack of support in the Shropshire press, Labour central office 
provided effective focused propaganda such as the leaflet, ‘Why the men and 
women who work on the land should join a union and vote for the Labour candidate’, 
which asserted that ‘the Labour representatives on the District Wages Commission 
have wrung A HIGHER MINIMUM WAGE from the farmers’ and promised ‘a still 
higher minimum wage…if the Labour party is sufficiently strengthened in 
Parliament.’42  
Likewise, the Unionists ‘gradually develop[ed] a variety of popular appeals 
after 1900, rooted in class, gender and regional identities’ as David Thackeray has 
recently noted. 43 One of the most successful Unionist leaflets in 1918 was ‘Cards 
and Coupons’ which made effective political capital out the popular antipathy 
towards rationing and regulations that was marked in a region such as the west 
midlands where the working class still prized what John Tosh has termed ‘manly 
independence.’44  The leaflet promised that, under a coalition government, Britons 
would not be ‘regulated more than is indispensable for a day longer than is 
necessary’, and contrasted their position with that of ‘the theoretical socialists of the 
ILP and the Labour Party’ who wanted ‘tickets for everything and officials to look 
after everybody.’45  Although the Unionists did manage to appeal to working-class 
men in this way, the most important achievement of the party after 1918 was in its 
appeal to the newly enfranchised female voter. 
Nicola Gullace has convincingly argued that the female voters who were 
enfranchised in 1918 were those ‘who had proved their aversion to pacifism and their 
support for the war’ and that limiting the franchise to those over thirty was designed 
to reward those mothers who had sacrificed ‘the blood of their sons.’46 Not 
surprisingly, an electoral discourse of sacrifice which focused on the ‘glorious dead’ 
of the previous four years emerged across the west midlands among Unionists and 
those who wished to benefit from association with the Coalition’s victory.47 The 
Unionists worked hard to tailor their message to this new group, with the Birmingham 
Unionist Association appointing ‘a woman under-secretary to organise the woman 
vote.’48 The Association also produced a series of effective campaign leaflets in 1918 
(including one titled A word to the Ladies! which focused on the need for adequate 
children services49). Candidates such as Edward Manville, who successfully stood in 
Coventry, included pledges of ‘equal pay for equal work done by women’ in their 
campaign literature.50 The Liberals, still wedded to the electoral value of the public 
meeting, organised women-only meetings in Wednesbury and Stourbridge and relied 
on electoral material from the Liberal Publications Department that stressed pre-war 
issues such as temperance and free trade, even in leaflets ostensibly aimed at 
women.51 Labour also struggled to focus its appeal to women at first. Even in the 
1918 election leaflet, Why women should join the Labour Party’, tellingly described 
the targets of its appeal as ‘every worker, man and woman.’ Labour also failed at first 
to develop its women’s organisation in the west midlands, beyond trade unions such 
as the National Federation of Women Workers.52   
On the other hand, there is much evidence that, in the west midlands, women 
were not immediately accepted as fit to exercise the franchise, which tallies with 
Laura Beer’s conclusion that ‘the media represented and appealed to [women] as 
unequal citizens.’53 In 1918 the Rugby Advertiser mocked the female voters’ 
electoral choices, commenting that ‘women’s logic is perplexing’ and citing a female 
canvasser who, when challenged, said ‘don’t ask me anything about politics!’ even 
though there was an active branch of the Unionist Women’s Citizen Association in 
the town.54 The Birmingham Post adopted a patronising tone in the final days before 
voting 
 In these notes nothing has been said on any ‘woman’s question’ Why ? 
Because the reasons for supporting the Coalition are precisely the same for 
you as for your brothers and husbands and sons. You now possess full 
citizenship and the first duty of the citizen is patriotism.55 
Similarly the Birmingham Unionist organ, Straight Forward, commented that women 
needed ‘training…by reason of their inexperience in politics’ and cited a recruiter for 
a ‘newly formed Women’s Unionist Association’ who was unable to explain the 
nature of the Association to those she sought to enlist.56 The dismissive attitude 
towards female voters in the local press is in contrast to the largely inclusive and 
egalitarian attitude towards women voters in the national press identified by Adrian 
Bingham.57 In the west midlands, women appear not to have been immediately 
welcomed into the public sphere. 
The political parties soon realised that supposed female ignorance of politics 
was, in fact, a symptom of women’s antipathy towards party politics, as 
demonstrated by the rise of non-political groups such as the Townswomen’s Guild 
and the Women’s Institute in the inter-war years.58 Although Beatrice Chamberlain 
expressed concern during the war that women were leaving Unionist Associations in 
favour of organisations such as the National Union of Women Workers which were 
‘ostensibly outside politics’, in fact the Conservative were well placed to exploit this 
trend, having organised the Primrose League as a largely social group in the pre-war 
years with a message of national unity and domestic renewal specifically aimed at 
female voters.59 The Midland Union Council swiftly added an amendment to its rules, 
decreeing that the executive committee of the Council should include at least three 
women.60 It must be noted, however, that a distaste for party politics following the 
collective war effort was not merely restricted to women, as the Birmingham Unionist 
Association noted the popular anger against party in their review of the ‘khaki’ 
election.61 To counter female voters’ avowed dislike of organisations that were too 
overtly political, Anne Chamberlain, wife of Neville, founded Unionist Women’s 
Institutes in Ladywood and Rotton Park and used the resources of the West 
Midlands Women’s Unionist Organisation to promote this clear attempt to hijack the 
growth of non-partisan women’s social gatherings by giving talks on issues relevant 
to women over thirty and holding children’s tea parties, limelight lectures and sewing 
parties. 62  Neville Chamberlain was astonished when he spoke at the UWI meeting 
in his own constituency to find that the meeting ‘seemed more like an infant welfare 
centre than a political gathering.’63 The organisation soon spread across Birmingham 
and into the wider west midlands and Annie Chamberlain found herself running the 
West Midland Women’s Unionist organisation.64 The Unionist women’s organisation 
also benefitted from the decision of the Women’s Unionist and Tariff Association and 
branches of the Primrose League formally to amalgamate with the party and to re-
brand themselves as the Women’s Unionist Association.65 Although some within the 
party criticised the ‘segregation’ of the party into gender-based organisations, others 
welcomed the contribution that these bodies could offer. As one writer to the 
Conservative Agents’ Journal put it, success in an age of mass democracy ‘stands or 
falls on … whether or not there is a good women’s organisation in the 
constituency.’66 This judgement appeared to be proved correct when 115 women 
canvassed Ladywood on behalf of Neville Chamberlain during the 1923 electoral 
campaign and enabled him to retain his seat, despite a sustained Labour 
challenge.67 The Unionist Party’s ascendancy was, in David Thackeray’s opinion, 
‘built, in part, on its ability to develop a substantial women’s movement, dwarfing its 
rivals’ which in turn was due to the creation of separate men’s and women’s 
branches of the Midland Unionist Association.68 By contrast, the Labour 
organisations were much slower to organise, with the Birmingham branch of the ILP 
only organising a conference on women’s organisations in February 1922 and then 
failing to discuss the issue again for a least a year.69 
The Women’s Party, founded in autumn 1917,  was savagely anti-Bolshevik 
and anti-pacifist, but simultaneously progressively feminist, supporting equal pay for 
equal work, equal marriage and reform of the divorce laws, equal opportunities in 
employment, state provision of maternity and infant care and co-operative housing 
scheme with the provision of hot water, crèches, nurseries and laundries, medical 
services and even gymnasiums.70 Although the policies were popular, the failure 
clearly to identify their audience had serious consequences. Following the hasty 
decision by parliament in November 1918 to allow women to stand for election, an 
unprepared Christabel Pankhurst was parachuted into the newly created seat of 
Smethwick in the Black Country. Lloyd George fulfilled his sense of obligation to the 
Pankhursts by granting Christabel the coupon, but she was no match for a Labour 
candidate who had been nursing the seat for years. Pankhurst was accurately seen 
as a candidate who had been, in the words of the ousted Unionist candidate, ‘sent 
down for the good of the country and possibly for the good of the women’s cause.’ In 
a ludicrous attack in a seat where the Labour candidate had led wartime recruitment 
drives and the National Union of Women Workers had a strong membership, 
Pankhurst claimed that ‘the Labour Party...was, in fact, a Bolshevist party because it 
was led by Bolshevists.’71 Pankhurst clearly lacked electoral literature, as the Daily 
Mail, one of the most enthusiastic backers of the Women’s Party, claimed that her 
campaign was hindered by rain which washed her supporters’ chalked slogans 
away.72 She lost by 755 votes and with this setback, as June Purvis puts it, the 
Women’s Party swiftly ‘faded away.’73 The local Unionist association determined to 
develop female politicians more locally, with two female councillors elected in 1918. 
Although both, together with a third female candidate, stood for the 1921 
Birmingham municipal elections, only one was successful and the Birmingham 
Unionist Association’s enthusiasm for female candidates swiftly waned.74 There were 
no female Unionist candidates in the 1923 Birmingham municipal elections. Anne 
Chamberlain, Neville’s tireless wife, continued to demonstrate that the chief political 
contribution that women could make in such a highly patriarchal society was that of 
the organiser and canvasser, playing a vital role in the 1924 Ladywood contest 
between Neville and Oswald Mosley which the former won by only 77 votes, thus  
guaranteeing that Neville’s swift political rise would not be halted.75  Labour seemed 
equally reluctant to put women forward with only Mrs C. M. Mitchell standing 
(successfully) in the Birmingham municipal election in November 1919 and Mrs M. E. 
Cottrell standing unsuccessfully in November 1920.76 
A crucial factor in the outcome of all elections is the social composition of the 
constituencies. The contrast between rural and urban seats was clearly evident 
between 1886 and 1910, with the Liberals, both Unionist and Gladstonian, 
dominating the more heavily industrial urban areas and the Conservatives operating 
an effective control of the rural and suburban seats. Pelling draws a clear, if 
somewhat questionable, distinction between ‘working-class’ constituencies such as 
Coventry and ‘middle-class’ seats such as Shrewsbury before 1914.77 The effect of 
the redistribution of constituencies which accompanied the RPA was to heighten the 
distinction between constituencies where the numbers of manual workers dominated 
and those more suburban and light industrial areas where there was a more 
professional and business profile to the electorate.  
While there were certainly fewer problems in reorganising the constituencies 
of the west midlands than there were in Ireland78, as the Birmingham Daily Post 
reported in January 1918, there was ‘considerable interest’ in the redistribution of 
seats in the city, largely owing to the dramatic change in Birmingham’s constituency 
boundaries.  It noted that appealing to old loyalties (which had saved Birmingham for 
Unionism in 1906) would no longer suffice, as ‘each of the present members who 
seeks re-election will have to ask for the suffrage of voters in new districts as well as 
those of old supporters.’79 In the whole of Great Britain the number of constituencies 
increased from 670 to 707 in 1918. Across England the number of borough and 
county seats increased by 29, so it is striking how little the west midlands benefitted 
from the redistribution. In 1910, the region returned 47 MPs and this did not change 
in 1918, in contrast to the increase in representation than was afforded to Wales and 
Scotland. What did occur in the west midlands was a redressing of the balance 
between borough and county seats with The Times suggesting in November 1917 
that the redistribution amounted to ‘an increase in the political power of the great 
towns.’80  
In 1910 Birmingham itself had eight MPs, Joseph Chamberlain’s famous 
‘seven’81 and Aston Manor, which was effectively part of Birmingham and had been 
recognized as such in the 1911 reorganisation of municipal boundaries. In 1918 the 
number of seats in the city was increased to twelve, but in reality, this merely drew 
clearer boundaries between the borough and county seats. The boundaries of 
Birmingham had actually grown between 1885 and 1918 to include portions of a 
further three seats, Staffordshire Handsworth, Tamworth and Worcestershire East. 
The first had been represented by Liberal Unionists continuously since 1886 while 
the last had been Austen Chamberlain’s seat for 26 years until 1918, which 
demonstrated their close affinity with Birmingham’s pre-war politics. Nevertheless, 
the verdict of most Birmingham politicians was that the city had been ‘favourably 
dealt with’ as the city now had, ‘more members than any other city outside London’ 
apart from Glasgow.82 This provoked a backlash from the agricultural interest in the 
region which lobbied one of the assistant commissioners of the boundary review at 
Birmingham Town Hall in August 1917. Lawrence Tipper, chairman of the 
Worcestershire chamber of agriculture, claimed that under the proposed distribution 
of seats in and around Birmingham, ‘agriculturists would be overpowered and 
outvoted by the urban population.’83 Reviewing the RPA later in 1918, Arthur Hobbs 
suggested that Birmingham’s increased electoral representation was partly as a 
result of the business premises qualification, which was designed, in his opinion ‘to 
preserve the separate identities of the commercial constituencies such as the City of 
London and certain divisions of Birmingham…and other large towns.’84 
One of the chief purposes of redistribution was supposedly to equalise the 
size of constituencies to reflect the changes in population since 1885 and the impact 
of the expansion of the franchise. Whilst this produced a large number of seats 
where the electorate was between 30, 000 and 40,000 there were a number of 
exceptions. County towns which retained a seat, even if the constituency expanded 
to include some of the surrounding countryside, such as Shrewsbury and Worcester 
had significantly smaller electorates, both having less than 26,000 electors. On the 
other hand, Coventry, which had grown considerably due to pre-war expansion and 
war-time industry, saw the enfranchisement of its largely working class population in 
1918, which resulted in an electorate of 62,066. The local press had been concerned 
at this inequality and had reported with some justified doubts, the claim of the 
Boundary Commission that some boroughs (including Coventry) would not be given 
two seats, despite their large populations, because the increase was purely the 
result of recruitment to munitions factories and would not be permanent.85 The 
Coventry Standard argued that Coventry’s growth would be permanent due to the 
expansion of the suburbs of Coundon, Foleshill, Keresley  and Binley in recent years 
and that there was a danger that disparity between parliamentary and municipal 
boundaries would cause ‘an increase of trouble and a diminution of satisfaction.’86 
Similarly, in Stoke-on-Trent, the increase in representation from 2 to 3 MPs was felt 
to be inadequate, given the huge growth of the population since 1885. 87 The issue in 
Coventry was raised by the City Council and then D. M. Mason, the Liberal MP for 
Coventry, took up the issue in parliament and moved an amendment on the 
Representation of the People Bill. However, he received no support in the house 
(possibly due to having been deselected by the Coventry Liberal Association before 
the war began), in reply, the Home Secretary, Sir George Cave, merely commented 
that he hoped Coventry ‘would do better in the next bill.’88 Cave’s dismissive attitude 
provoked an angry response from the local press and the Coventry board of 
guardians, but in truth, it was too late and Mason was too marginalised a figure in the 
Commons to achieve anything.89 
Other areas were angered by the increase in the size of the constituency 
which redistribution brought. The leader column of the Leamington Spa Courier 
described the proposed expansion of the Warwick and Leamington constituency as 
‘unwieldy’ as it now contained Kenilworth, Stratford-upon-Avon and Alcester as well 
as the two towns. The population of this area was 83,000 people, and the paper 
noted that this was far in excess of the 70,000 figure fixed by the Speaker’s 
conference as the ideal size of a constituency. It was also far higher than the county 
borough seat of Worcester, which fell at least 40,000 people short of the ideal figure, 
yet which was retained in the redistribution.90 The Courier also noted that agricultural 
and urban issues would be confused and that ‘the historic continuity of such a 
historic borough as Warwick’ would be destroyed.91 The removal of the name 
Stratford-upon-Avon was regarded as ‘a snub or rather a humiliation.’92 The 
renaming of the North Worcestershire constituency as ‘Stourbridge’ also drew the ire 
of Oldbury District Council who objected that their town had not been named in the 
constituency, despite being almost the same size as Stourbridge.93 Their concerns 
were not resolved, but when Evelyn Cecil raised the issue in the House that the 
proposed naming of a new Birmingham constituency as ‘Hockley’ would mean the 
end of the ‘West Birmingham’ constituency, famously associated with Joseph 
Chamberlain, Cave swiftly backed down and allowed the old name of the seat to 
survive, prompting cheers from the government benches.94 
When the boundary commissioners visited the west midlands in July 1917, 
they were largely faced with apathy from a population focused on the increasingly 
bitter conflict in Flanders and a political class that had been ‘quiescent’ since1914.95 
Only the size of the representation of Coventry and the constituency boundaries of 
South Warwickshire were seriously challenged.96 In Leamington and Warwick, the 
challenge was quite ill-tempered, with the chairman of Warwickshire County Council 
claiming that the proposal redistribution of seats ‘bore the stamp of having been 
drawn by some clerk in London who did not know much of the interior working of the 
county.’97 The anger of the Unionist Association was also noted, largely as two fairly 
safe seats, Stratford and Warwick would be combined into one. Ludford Docker, 
brother of the influential Birmingham industrialist, Dudley Docker, had been 
nominated as the successor to the sitting Stratford MP, and the amalgamation of the 
two urban areas left him without prospects.98 The level of protest was relatively 
muted, however, and the boundary commissioners’ initial recommendations were 
ultimately forwarded to Parliament and accepted by them without revision. 
If the redistribution of seats in 1918 had had little impact in the region, the 
clauses in the RPA which attempted to reduce electoral corruption did more to 
transform the culture of politics in the west midlands.  Worcester had been notorious 
as a corrupt borough before 1914. There had been allegations of ‘treating’ by 
Conservative candidates in the municipal elections of November 1904.99 The 
relatively small size of the parliamentary electorate and the threat of a Liberal victory 
had encouraged the Conservative candidate’s supporters to engage in similar tactics 
in 1906. The Liberals, defeated by a mere 129 votes that year, had petitioned 
parliament and a Royal Commission had been held. Although it did not find evidence 
of widespread corruption, the Commission did conclude that ‘a class of voters, 
numbering about 500…are prepared to sell their vote for drink or money.’100 It was 
behaviour such as this that the RPA’s expenses clauses aimed to stamp out. The 
banning of auxiliary organisations from campaigning for candidates under the RPA to 
ensure equality between candidates of different parties (and to restrict the influence 
of trade unionists in favour of the Labour candidate), did much to reduce the bitter 
antagonism that such bodies had brought to Edwardian politics.101 This had the 
effect of reducing the extent of disturbance and destruction traditionally associated 
with elections, though this was arguably more influenced by the presence of women 
as political actors, which would have considerably affected the public behaviour of 
men in the political arena. To give one example of the sudden change in political 
street culture after the war, a shop opposite Worcester Guildhall (the site of the 
declaration in the constituency) was barricaded in the expectation of crowd trouble 
on 28 December 1918, but only 200 people were present for what the local paper 
described as the ‘tamest declaration day ever seen in the city.’102 
Under the terms of the 1883 Corrupt Practices Act, returning officers routinely 
sent the candidates’ expenses to the press, and those that were printed indicate that 
Smith Child, the successful candidate in Stone in December 1918, spent £878 14s. 
10d. in winning the seat. The maximum sum permitted in election expenses was 
sevenpence for every registered voter in a county constituency, fivepence in a 
borough constituency.103 From a survey of the expenses of other Staffordshire 
candidates, Smith Child’s appears a fairly average claim, although it is noticeable 
that most Labour candidates claimed less than their coalition rivals, a shrewd 
political move given the contemporary national hostility towards ‘profiteering’ and 
‘waste’.104 The statement printed in the Staffordshire Advertiser clearly indicated that 
Smith Child was not claiming any personal expenses as he excluded the £61 10s. as 
‘paid by himself’. It was, however, striking that Child paid a mere £43 8s. 3d. for the 
hire of rooms, compared to his Labour co-operative rival, George Townsend, who 
spent £71 16s. 7d. on room hire, out of expenses that only amounted to £595 12s 
.10d.105 Possibly Smith Child had gathered that money spent on public meetings was 
increasingly wasted as a smaller proportion of the electorate now attended these and 
he was choosing instead to spend more on advertising (Smith Child spent £462 14s. 
11d. on ‘goods supplied and work and labour done’). Or perhaps, given his position 
as Commander in the Royal Artillery of the 46th (North Midland) Division of the 
Territorials, he had been offered premises gratis by patriotic and wealthy 
supporters.106 Smith Child’s large expenses, allowed given the increase of the 
electorate, were overshadowed by those of the Welsh architect, William Rees, who 
claimed £979 2s. 4d. for his unsuccessful bid to unseat James Parker, the Coalition 
Labour candidate in Cannock. 107 But not even Rees’ profligacy could match that of 
the hapless Willie Dyson, the National Democratic and Labour candidate for 
Nuneaton, who claimed for expenses totalling £1,131 4s. 4d., despite only gaining 
1,101 votes, which meant that each vote had cost over £1, as the Unionist Tamworth 
Herald somewhat gleefully pointed out.108 The possibility of the misuse of taxpayers’ 
funds which this suggests is borne out by curious expenses returns such as those of 
Ernest Pollock, who claimed for £599 1s. 1d. at Warwick and Leamington, including 
nearly £200 for the employment of an agent, clerks and messengers and £43 5s. 7d. 
for ‘miscellaneous expenses’ in an election where he faced no opponent.109 
Nonetheless, by 1922, a correspondent to The Times noted that the 
unforeseen result of the election expenses clauses of the RPA, had, in fact, been a 
de facto glass ceiling on the social class of potential candidates. As the Walsall-born 
Unionist MP John Lort-Williams commented,  
choice is restricted,  generally, to candidates with means, such as 
professional, business or professional men in middle-age or older, profiteers, 
pensioners, what is left of the landed gentry and scions of the nobility with 
sufficient means and those who have succeeded in marrying wives with 
money.110 
In the 1922 election, it is notable that several west midlands candidates put in 
expenses claims of over £1,000, indicating that the costs of campaigning were 
notably higher once normal times had returned after 1918. 111 
With the reduction of candidates’ permitted expenses and the increase in the size of 
the electorate, the nature of political communication underwent a final shift away 
from the public meeting which had been a vital feature of pre-war political culture.112 
Hiring halls and paying to staff the meetings was a risky venture with limited funds 
when there were frequently few locations in a constituency which could house a 
reasonable audience and no guarantee that those who attended were those 
undecided voters who the candidate most needed to persuade. Instead, the 
Edwardian explosion in printed, highly visual propaganda continued, together with an 
increased use of publicity materials and commercial advertising, especially in leaflets 
and local newspapers.113 The decline in direct confrontation between political 
opponents that the public meeting had traditionally provided, also contributed, 
according to Jon Lawrence, to a far less rowdy and disruptive political culture in the 
inter-war years.114 
The RPA permitted the sending ‘free of any charge for postage…one postal 
communication containing matter relating to the election only, and no exceeding two 
ounces in weight.’115  This led to a development of increasingly sophisticated 
publicity materials, best exemplified by Sir Edward Manville’s election leaflet, 
distributed across Coventry in November 1918. Manville and his local party 
association managed to present their electoral message using both sides of the 
small leaflet, even designing it to be read when it was folded for postage through 
voters’ letterboxes and filled with dates of meetings, advice for voters and attractive 
non-partisan slogans.116 Given the limited number of posters that could be produced 
in time for the hastily-called contest in December 1918, this was a highly effective 
alternative means of delivering the Unionist message, and Manville won the seat 
against five rival candidates with a majority of over 7,000 votes. 
The post-war politics of the west midlands was marked henceforth by press 
battles rather than physical aggression. Once the dust had settled from the 1918 
election, the Unionists of Birmingham, worried by the rise of Labour in the city after 
November 1919, discussed the ‘urgent need for a local Unionist publication of some 
kind to counter-act the Socialistic propaganda.’117 This ‘propaganda’ had chiefly 
appeared in the form of the Town Crier which had been relaunched by the 
Birmingham Labour Party, the ILP and the Birmingham Trades Council in October 
1919, as well as the daily Birmingham Gazette which had backed Labour since the 
split in the Liberal Party in 1916.118 It was agreed by the BUA management 
committee that the journal should be named Straight Forward and the first issue, 
costing one penny, was printed in September 1920 with a mission statement ‘to 
expose false prophets who seek to delude ignorant people.’119 The Unionist 
Association then established a propaganda committee to promote a nuanced 
message suited to the working men and women of the city.120   
The most significant change in political culture instigated by the RPA in the 
west midlands appears to have been a decline in the effect of denominationalism on 
political allegiance.121 Before 1914, the alliance between nonconformist churches 
and liberalism was already breaking down, as D. W. Bebbington observed when he 
commented that ‘sections of nonconformity…were swayed by their economic interest 
to transfer their votes from the Liberals…to the Unionists’ and he noted that 
Wesleyan Methodists were particularly prone to do so.122 Once the bulk of the 
population had been enfranchised in 1918, this process was rapidly accelerated, as 
the indifference of working class communities to religious denominationalism had 
long been a concern of Victorian and Edwardian Christians. The issues of 
temperance, disestablishment and religious control of education, so central to Liberal 
politics and a crucial feature of their revival between 1902 and 1906, failed to 
resonate with a new class of voter, more concerned to see his or her children at the 
best possible school, to be able to afford a decent standard of living and looking for 
comfort following the sacrifices of the Great War.123 Once the First World War began, 
as Arthur Burns has established, the Church of England proved itself better placed 
than the nonconformists to exploit its status as the ‘national’ church.124 The 
cathedrals of the west midlands, such as Worcester, St Philips in Birmingham, 
Lichfield and the newly raised St Michael’s in Coventry, became the location of 
chapels of remembrance, with tattered flags, books of remembrance, memorials to 
‘the glorious dead’ and annual services on 11 November, to which flocked thousands 
of different faiths (and none) flocked. Stanley Baldwin spoke of ‘the grand old 
national church of England’ in a fashion which transcended denominational lines of 
belief and secured the Church of England a place of respect and admiration in post-
war Britain that it had scarcely enjoyed in the Victorian era.125  
Among the Labour activists, the moderate ‘Labour Church’ movement which 
had been particularly powerful in pre-war Birmingham, was revived by the 
Birmingham branch of the ILP, but there is no indication from the pages of the Town 
Crier that this movement reached an audience beyond existing ILP members.126 Neil 
Johnson goes so far as to suggest that the ‘Labour Churches’ were merely ILP 
meetings held on a Sunday evening, so called in order ‘to placate certain sensitivities 
about political events taking place on the Sabbath.’ He also theorises that the term 
‘Labour Church’ was actually re-animated in post-war Birmingham as a (largely 
unsuccessful) ploy to overcome the peculiarly ‘consensual nature of industrial 
relations in Birmingham’ after 1918.127  In the elections of 1918, 1922, 1923 and 
1924, the lack of a clear denominational divide between the parties was consistently 
noted, and the attempts of long-serving Liberals to appeal to nonconformist 
consciences had very limited effect as Robert Outhwaite, David Mason, John Wilson 
and Richard Fairbairn all soon discovered.128 Stanley Baldwin and Neville 
Chamberlain both continued the tradition, begun by Joseph Chamberlain in the 
1880s, of appealing to the nonconformist tradition as part of British civic identity 
rather than as a separate entity and then delivering the votes of this community to 
the Unionist cause.129 The only religious group clearly excluded from the national 
collective was ‘the Jew’ who was frequently associated with Bolshevism in both 
Germany and Russia in Unionist publications and was frequently the butt of jokes 
regarding his assumed untrustworthiness and ‘cosmopolitan’ identity.130 As Stuart 
Ball has noted, ‘there certainly was an under-current of anti-Semitism in 
Conservative [and Unionist] circles’ especially in the febrile atmosphere of post-war 
Europe.131 
Shortly after becoming prime minister in 1923, Baldwin appointed Neville 
Chamberlain as his Chancellor of the Exchequer, forming an alliance which would 
last for the next fourteen years. Baldwin and Chamberlain used the west midlands as 
the electoral base from which to control the Conservative Party and the politics of the 
nation. Only once, in 1929, was their dominance in the region challenged and this 
was soon rectified in the landslide of 1931 when they even made in-roads into the 
only Labour area in the region, the Black Country.132 Their appeal was, appropriately 
enough in the former ‘fiefdom’ of Joseph Chamberlain, based on liberal values of 
religious and wider cultural tolerance, social reform (in particular, housing) and, of 
course, protectionism in 1923 and 1931 (and its more limited industrial form of 
‘safeguarding’ in 1924 and 1929). This programme was designed to offer a more 
convincing alternative to Labour than that offered by the fractious and increasingly 
penurious Liberal Party or by Lloyd George and the ardent coalitionists (the latter 
including Neville’s half-brother, Austen, who had, in Peter Marsh’s words, ‘lost touch 
with the grass roots of his party’).133 The west midland Unionists made it clear that 
they regarded the ‘Labour’ Party as a deception practised on the working man, by 
men ‘who work hand in hand behind the scenes with Russian Bolshevists and 
German Jews.’134 Neville Chamberlain’s sincere commitment to social issues and his 
family’s philanthropic efforts to improve housing in Birmingham paid rich political 
dividends in a city where, as Briggs explains in the official history of the city, ‘housing 
[was pushed] into the centre of the picture before the war ended in 1918.’135 
Baldwin’s strategy, to trump both traditional local-sectarian and newly 
emerging class-based politics with a seemingly non-political appeal to a nation 
hungry for a purpose in the aftermath of a shattering war has been described as 
‘new Conservatism.’136 But in many ways, this approach was a partnership between 
Baldwin’s rural traditionalists and the urban liberalism of Neville Chamberlain and his 
supporters. Very rarely have commentators noticed that the two men, whose 
partnership was the key to the Unionist dominance of the period between 1922 and 
1937, were MPs for west midland constituencies that were a mere 20 miles apart. 
The key responses of Baldwin and Chamberlain to the RPA were a shared 
willingness to consider social and imperial reform, resistance to the demands of 
right-wing ideologues in their party and in the press, and tolerance of the legitimacy 
of the Labour Party (albeit a tolerance marked with vigorous political opposition). In 
this respect, the two men built on the traditions of ‘Tory democracy’ and radical 
Unionism and thereby managed to outmanoeuvre challengers to their dominance 
from both within the Conservative Party (such as Winston Churchill) and without. In 
the west midlands, Conservative extremists such as Sir Richard Cooper and 
alternative right-wing parties such as the National Democratic and Labour Party, the 
National Party and the Women’s Party were soon side-lined once their electoral 
appeal proved short-lived. Chamberlain and Baldwin realized that the decline of the 
Liberals, the sudden removal of the issue of Irish home rule and the more extreme 
policies of Labour afforded the Unionists a political opportunity that might not come 
again. Less cynically, both men had been genuinely impressed by the patriotic 
response that the war had evoked from all social groups and they wished to 
articulate policies that would continue to bring the national community together.137 
Despite their antipathy towards Lloyd George, both men had supported the coalition 
government until 1922 in the belief that it would promote and maintain the cross-
class unity of the Great War.138  
Baldwin is celebrated as a great communicator, rather than a great legislator 
and Robert Self has shown that Neville Chamberlain also proved to be a very 
effective speaker, despite his personal reserve. 139 Both men sought to exploit radio 
and cinema to transmit their message of practical, non-ideological, common-sense 
responses to domestic and international problems to as wide a range of the mass 
electorate as possible. Both men enjoyed a (largely) positive relationship with the 
local press and both were careful to cultivate the support of John Reith, the anti-
Churchillian Director-General of the recently-founded BBC.140 They both endorsed a 
style of political campaigning that saw the Unionists in the west midlands routinely 
running regular ‘surgeries’ and visiting the homes and recreational clubs and 
institutes of their constituents (even though Neville Chamberlain clearly did not enjoy 
this experience, referring to it in private as ‘slumming’).141 They ensured that the 
apparatus of party organisation and the staffing of party bodies remained in their 
hands, refusing to allow any democratisation or too much centralisation of the 
political system in the west midlands. The Unionists of the region may have 
successfully presented themselves as patriotic, moderate social reformers, but they 
remained paternalistic elites who largely saw the newly enlarged electorates as 
entities to be ‘managed’ rather than consulted. 
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